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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota has three state constitutions. This may be unique in
the constitutional history of the United States. The state has one
of the shortest and most modern state fundamental laws, a re-
vised text of which was adopted in 1974.1 That constitution is,
however, only an amendment and simplification of the previous
constitution, adopted by the people in 1857, which became the
basic law of the state when Minnesota was admitted to the Union
in 1858. But the 1857 constitution itself had two separate au-
thentic texts-somewhat different in detail-that originated in
separate constitutional conventions. Since the 1974 constitution
is simply a restatement of their text(s), Minnesota has the luxury
of three fundamental laws.
The use of state constitutions is experiencing a comeback, and
the Minnesota Constitution is no exception. The brief introduc-
tion to the Minnesota Constitution contained in part II explores
why Minnesota courts increasingly look homeward first to re-
solve constitutional challenges. Part III then summarizes the his-
t Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School; of counsel to Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd., Minneapolis. The
author served as Research Director of the Constitutional Study Commission from 1971
to 1973.
1. 1974 MINN. LAws ch. 409.
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tory of Minnesota's constitution and takes the reader on a "short
tour" of the document. Part IV recommends a procedural ap-
proach for an invocation of state constitutional law. Part IV goes
on to compare differences in language between the federal and
Minnesota Constitutions as grounds for an independent state
analysis. The section concludes by pointing out other sources of
individual rights protection in the Minnesota Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND IN THE APPLICATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Across the nation, state constitutional law has recently
reemerged as an important limitation on governmental author-
ity. In the first half of the nineteenth century, state constitutions
were virtually the only bulwark of the citizen against overreach-
ing by state and local officials. Until the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1868, the Federal Bill of Rights was held
to apply only against the federal government and not against
state and local authorities.2 Even after the adoption of that im-
portant provision, and well into this century, federal protections
were largely secondary to state constitutional limitations.3
The increase in protections for civil liberties provided through
federal constitutional doctrines and the federal courts eventually
drove state doctrines into the background.4 With the activism of
2. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 247 (1833). Federal protection, how-
ever, did extend to claims based on the main text of the constitution. See, e.g., Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (applying the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)
(applying the Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 10).
3. "Only rarely in the 19th century did individuals challenge the exercise of fed-
eral authority." WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., The Bill of Rights: State Constitutions as Guardians
of Individual Rights, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 1987, at 16 [hereinafter Brennan, The Bill of
Rights]. From the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 until 1897, the
Supreme Court consistently held that specific provisions of the Bill of Rights were not
applicable to the states. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HAIv. L. REv. 489, 493 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitu-
tions]. Even then, application of the Bill of Rights' restraints to state action "was slow in
coming." Id. For example, from the time the Minnesota Constitution was adopted in
1857 until First Amendment free speech guarantees were held to apply to the states in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), "the Minnesota Constitution was the only
source of protection for its citizens against state infringement of free speech and free
exercise of religion." Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights:
"Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAMINE L. REv. 51, 56-57 (1984).
4. See Melissa Sheridan & Bradford S. Delapena, Individual Liberties Claims: Promot-
ing a Healthy Constitution for Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. Rev. 683, 689-90 (1993).
"Since the minimum protections provided by federal law were more generous than
even the most expansive state protections, lawyers did not bother to raise state constitu-
tional claims. As a result, the use of state constitutions atrophied." Id.
[Vol. 20
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the Warren Court in' protecting the rights of minorities and the
accused, federal doctrines acquired even greater significance.
5
Procedural advantages available in federal courts enhanced the
popularity of bringing claims under the federal guarantees even
more. By applying federal constitutional law, state courts fre-
quently found it unnecessary to reach state constitutional issues.6
When reliance on state constitutions was necessary, state courts
often interpreted them in a manner that paralleled the federal
doctrines.' As a result of these factors, state constitutions lapsed
into dormancy.8
Minnesota courts historically have been progressive-and
often aggressive-in protecting individual rights through appli-
cation of state constitutional doctrines. For example, long
before a federal right to counsel was extended to misdemeanor
defendants who faced possible imprisonment, Minnesota courts
established a similar rule under the Minnesota Constitution.9
Yet the expansion of federal doctrines, especially during the pe-
riod of the Warren Court, stunted the evolution of state constitu-
tional law in Minnesota as it did elsewhere. 10 Claimants who
5. In the years from 1962 to 1969, many Federal Bill of Rights protections were
extended to the states. See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 3, at 493. These
included: 1) the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments; 2) the right to
counsel; 3) the privilege against self-incrimination; 4) the right to confront witnesses; 5)
the right to a speedy and public trial; 6) the right to a jury; 7) the right to subpoena
witnesses; and 8) the right to be free from doublejeopardy. Id. at 493-94 (citing United
States Supreme Court decisions that extended these provisions to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
6. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 4, at 689 ("[L]awyers, who sought to vindi-
cate a criminal defendant's rights, ignored state law claims, recognizing that such vindi-
cation would more likely be achieved under federal law.").
7. See, e.g., Nelson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1981) (holding that
the Minnesota and federal equal protection doctrines are the same); O'Connor v.John-
son, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (holding that state and federal safeguards
against unreasonable searches and seizures are the same).
8. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 4, at 689-90; Brennan, State Constitutions,
supra note 3, at 495. In light of the increasing reliance on state constitutions, one
scholar suggests using them in a principled way, rather than ad hoc, to expand rights
construed narrowly by the United States Supreme Court. See Ronald K. L. Collins, Reli-
ance on State Constitutions-Away From A Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1,
2 (1981).
9. Compare State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967) (ex-
tending the right to counsel to indigents charged with misdemeanors that could lead to
incarceration) with Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment requires that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial") (emphasis added).
10. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 4, at 688-90.
19941
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could find strong support in federal law did not need to turn to
the state's fundamental instrument." Law schools stopped
teaching state constitutional doctrines, thus producing a genera-
tion of lawyers who were virtually unaware of this added constitu-
tional protection.
1 2
In the 1980s, all of this began to alter. Changes in the compo-
sition and approach of the United States Supreme Court limited
the protection that claimants had come to expect under various
federal constitutional doctrines, ranging from equal protection
to criminal procedure.1 3 At the same time, or, more likely, as a
response to these federal limits, many state high courts have re-
turned to their state's fundamental instrument as a source of ad-
ditional protection for individual rights.14 The Minnesota
Supreme Court is no exception.
Concurrent with a more restrictive view of the individual
rights protected by the Constitution, the United States Supreme
Court has also reemphasized the principles of federalism.15
Freedom of state action brings with it the power to enforce state
constitutional protections more stringently than those protec-
tions now available under the federal instrument. The Court has
explicitly recognized the right of states to limit the authority of
their own state and local authorities more restrictively than fed-
eral doctrines require. 6 The Minnesota Supreme Court has ag-
11. Id.
12. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 3, at 54.
13. See Brennan, The Bill of Rights, supra note 3, at 17-18; see also Sheridan & De-
lapena, supra note 4, at 690; see also Ann Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third
Millennium: "Old Formulations" or "New Articulations"?, 20 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 337
(1994); Jack Tunheim, Criminal Justice: Expanded Protections Under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 465 (1994).
14. This renewed interest in state constitutions has led some law journals to devote
special issues to state constitutional analysis. See, e.g., 23 RUrGERS L.J. 723-1094 (1992)
(Rutgers Law Journal's fourth annual issue on state constitutional law); 8 TouRo L.
REv. 1 (Touro Law Review's first annual issue on New York State constitutional law); 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 227-588 (1994) (William Mitchell Law Review's first special issue
on Minnesota State Constitutional Law).
15. This has been evident, for example, in the presumption against preemption of
regulatory areas by federal legislation. See, e.g., Joseph T. McLaughlin and Kimberly A.
O'Toole, Federal Preemption, A.L.I. 639 (1993) (discussing federal decisions that allow
state tort law claims despite federal regulation of certain areas, including cigarette label-
ing, pesticide regulation, and nuclear safety); see also Hans A. Linde, Does the "New Feder-
alism" Have a Future?, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONsT. L. 251 (1991); David A Schlueter,
Federalism and Supreme Court Review of Expansive State Court Decisions: A Response to Unfortu-
nate Impressions, 11 IHASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 523 (1984).
16. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Long was remanded to the Michi-
gan Supreme Court to determine whether a police search of the defendant's car trunk
[Vol. 20
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gressively taken advantage of this authority in the past and may
be in a position to act even more broadly in the future.
One of the most striking and well-known Minnesota cases is
State v. Hershberger,17 which involved the constitutionality of a
state statute requiring that operators of horse-drawn buggies and
other slow moving vehicles display the common orange Slow-
Moving-Vehicle warning triangle on the rear of their vehicles."8
Amish farmers in southern Minnesota found this symbol offen-
sive to their religious beliefs and refused to display the warning
devices. The Hershberger defendants were cited for failure to dis-
play the warning devices. The appeal was brought under both
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the corre-
sponding provisions of the Minnesota Constitution. However,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider
the state constitutional issues in its original review of the case.19
Instead, the court struck down the requirement as a violation of
Amish citizens' First Amendment free exercise rights, relying on
the Federal Constitution and then-recognized federal
precedents.2 °
The State appealed this decision to the United States Supreme
Court.2 1 While Minnesota v. Hershberger2 2 was pending before it,
the Court decided another case, Employment Division v. Smith,23
that narrowed the precedents on which the Minnesota court had
relied. The United States Supreme Court then vacated and re-
manded Hershberger for reconsideration in light of its newly is-
sued decision in Smith.24  A straightforward application of Smith
would have required reversal of the Minnesota decision.
was permissible under the Federal Constitution. In a footnote, the Court stated that the
Michigan court was "free to determine the validity of that search under state law." Id. at
1053 n.17. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981)
("A state court may, of course, apply a more stringent standard of review as a matter of
state law under the State's equivalent to the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.").
17. 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989) [hereinafter Hershberger 1], vacated sub nom. Min-
nesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990), on remand, State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Hershberger I/].
18. Hershberger I, 444 N.W.2d at 284.
19. Id. at 289-90.
20. Id.
21. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
22. Id.
23. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
24. Hershberger, 495 U.S. at 901.
19941
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On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the
question for the first time under the Minnesota Constitution.25
The court found that the traffic code's requirement of a triangle
violated the state constitution's own free exercise standards,26
even though it probably no longer violated the federal norms.
2 1
The court's new interpretation of the free exercise clause of the
Minnesota Constitution generally paralleled the old interpreta-
tion of the federal standard.2 8 Moreover, the Minnesota court
did not need to reach or reconsider the federal question. By
relying exclusively on an independent state ground in its analy-
sis, the court foreclosed further federal review of the case. 29 The
Minnesota Supreme Court's recognition of the state constitu-
tional doctrine established a tougher standard for review of the
validity of state legislation under the Minnesota Constitution.3
25. Hershberger I, 462 N.W.2d at 397.
26. See MINN. CoNST. art. I, § 16. That section provides:
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair others
retained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed;
nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of wor-
ship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent;
nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be per-
mitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or
mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the
treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological
seminaries.
Id.
27. Hershberger.II, 462 N.W.2d at 399. The Minnesota court held that the state
failed to demonstrate that its interest in public safety could not by achieved through
reasonable alternative means that would not infringe on the Amish community's free-
dom of conscience rights guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution. Id. The court
declined to reconsider the case under the federal standard. Id. at 395-96. If anything,
the court hinted that it could affirm Hershberger I based on associational freedoms also
infringed by the statute. Id.
28. The Federal Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Compare id. with MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 16, supra note 26. The differ-
ence in language between the Minnesota Bill of Rights and its federal counterpart ap-
pears to afford Minnesota citizens greater protection than the corresponding federal
provisions. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 3, at 68-69. Furthermore, the difference
in text "serves to lessen the force of United States Supreme Court decisions which only
refer to the more limited protection afforded by the Federal Bill of Rights." Id. at 68.
29. Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d at 396-97.
30. Id. at 397. The Hershberger II court observed that the language of the Minnesota
Constitution:
[I]s of a distinctively stronger character than the federal counterpart ....
Whereas the first amendment establishes a limit on government action at the
point of prohibiting the exercise of religion, section 16 precludes even an in-
[Vol. 20
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has declared its independence
from parallel interpretations of similar federal constitutional
provisions on a number of subsequent occasions. Several are the
subjects of articles in this symposium issue.31 Still other possibili-
ties continue to present themselves.
In order to invoke more extensive state constitutional protec-
tion than the base-level protections provided under the Federal
Constitution, the so-called "adequate and independent state
ground" doctrine must necessarily be satisfied. 2 Primarily, this
means that pleadings and briefs must be drafted to separately
identify the state constitutional doctrine invoked and to request a
separate ruling.3 3 In order to ensure that the state decision will
be conclusive, courts must also rely on the state doctrine as a
separate claim and explicitly indicate its distinctness from the
fringement on or an interference with religious freedom. Accordingly, govern-
ment actions that may not constitute an outright prohibition on religious
practices (thus not violating the first amendment) could nonetheless infringe
on or interfere with those practices, violating the Minnesota Constitution.
Commentators have noted 'the state Bill of Rights expressly grants affirmative
rights in the area[ ] of... religious worship while the corresponding federal
provision simply attempts to restrain governmental action.'
Id. (citing Fleming & Nordby, supra note 3, at 67). See also supra note 26 (comparing
the language of the state and federal bills of rights). The court concluded that "Min-
nesotans are afforded greater protection for religious liberties against governmental
action under the state constitution than under the first amendment of the federal con-
stitution." Id.
31. See Ijima, supra note 13 (equal protection); Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of Regu-
latoy Takings, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433 (1994) (regulatory takings); Michael K.
Steenson, Fundamental Rights in the "Gray" Area: The Right to Privacy Under the Minnesota
Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 383 (1994) (privacy rights).
32. The doctrine was originally articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555-57 (1940) (remanding "so that the
federal question might be dissected out or the state and federal questions clearly sepa-
rated" because there was "considerable uncertainty" as to whether the state court based
its decision on state or federal grounds). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983) (articulating the current, more limited, formulation).
In Long, the Court reasoned:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy
and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face
of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state
court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law re-
quired it to do so .... If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly
that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.
Id. at 1040-41.
33. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 4, at 710; see also Fleming & Nordby, supra
note 3, at 55-56 (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to disturb decisions based on
adequate and independent state grounds) (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,
556 n.5 (1983); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945)).
19941
7
Morrison: An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
federal claim.34  The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted
what amounts to a standard litany for invocation of this
doctrine.35
The starting point for arguing and analyzing constitutional
claims on independent state grounds is the state's fundamental
law as provided in its state constitution. The next section exam-
ines the origin and history of the Minnesota Constitution and
explores some of the document's unique characteristics.
III. THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
The present text of the Minnesota Constitution dates from
1974,36 when the voters adopted a comprehensive constitutional
amendment, called the Structure and Form Amendment, which
heavily edited the language of the old 1858 constitution. Tech-
nically, this is not a "new" constitution, but simply the product of
editing and restatement of the "old" fundamental law. Approxi-
mately one-third of the verbiage of the old constitution was elim-
inated and the remainder was reorganized into a more orderly
and easily understandable text. The elaborate legal language of
the nineteenth century was also replaced with the more pithy
syntax of the twentieth century in the "new" constitution.
A "short tour" of the Minnesota Constitution will provide a
framework for identifying important constitutional principles.
Like most state constitutions, the Minnesota document does not
34. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 4, at 708-10.
35. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1987). In Gray the court stated:
It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own state constitu-
tion to offer greater protection of individual rights than does the federal con-
stitution. Indeed, as the highest court of this state, we are "independently
responsible for safeguarding the rights of [our] citizens." State courts are, and
should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist
system. This, of course, does not mean that we will or shoulol cavalierly con-
strue our constitution more expansively than the United States Supreme
Court has construed the federal constitution.
Id. at 111 (citing State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (citations omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court continues to reject parallels to federal constitu-
tional standards relying on independent state grounds. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 477
N.W.2d 886, 888 (1991) (applying a stricter rational basis test than used under the
federal constitution, the court held that the statutory distinction between crack cocaine
and powdered cocaine violated the state constitution's equal protection guarantee);
Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d at 397 (holding that the state constitution's freedom of con-
science rights were broader than those under the Federal Free Exercise Clause). For a
thorough discussion of expanded equal protection rights under the Minnesota Consti-
tution, see Iijima, supra note 13, at 337.
36. A table of contents can be found at Appendix One.
[Vol. 20
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follow the format of the United States Constitution. For exam-
ple, the bill of rights is in the front, not the back;17 amendments
are directly incorporated into the text, not added on at the end;
and the articles are organized along somewhat different
principles.
Some history will aid in understanding and interpreting the
Minnesota Constitution. The following section briefly details the
political and social backdrop underlying the drafting and evolu-
tion of the Minnesota Constitution.
A. History of the Constitution
The Minnesota Constitution was born in the legal and polit-
ical turmoil that preceded the Civil War in what was then a fron-
tier area. When the Minnesota Territory was seeking statehood,
a convention was assembled in 1857 to propose a constitution
for submission to the people.38
A number of issues divided the Republican and Democrat par-
ties. Because the Minnesota Territory was too large to be made
into one state, Congress had to decide how to divide the terri-
tory. 9 Another point of contention was the issue of suffrage,
with the Republicans advocating the right to vote regardless of
race or color.4° One of the major issues, however, was which
party would "be able to claim that Minnesota belonged in its
camp, and to be in a position to command the votes of Minne-
sota's delegation to Congress. The campaign [of 1857 for dele-
37. Id.
38. 11 Stat. 166 (1857).
39. At the time, the states most recently admitted to the union were Iowa and Wis-
consin. Both of these states are smaller in area than Minnesota ultimately became.
Much of the territorial dispute was attributable to national politics. Northern politi-
cians in Congress wanted more allies to counter the politicians from the south during
this era of political turmoil over slavery issues. See WILLIAM ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 62 (1921). Anderson provides a comprehensive his-
tory of Minnesota through 1920, from which much of this discussion is derived.
The Minnesota Democrats were largely from the "northern" cities of Saint Paul,
Saint Anthony and Stillwater. Id. at 45. The Republican minority was from the south-
ern region of Minnesota. Id. The Republicans, jealous of the Democrat's superior
power, wanted to weaken this power by dividing the state with an east/west boundary
just north of Saint Paul. Id. at 47. Because under this arrangement the northern cities
would no longer be centrally located, the capital of the new state would have to be
moved southward, resulting in a shift of political power. The Democrats successfully
resisted such a division of the state. Id. at 49.
40. 1 WILLIAM WATTS FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA 412-13 (1956).
1994]
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gates to the constitutional convention] was nearly devoid of all
ideas save that of carrying Minnesota for the party."
41
The convention was so sharply divided that it was not able to
settle election disputes or elect officers.42 Unable to resolve dis-
sention, two groups of delegates43 representing Democrats and
Republicans retired to separate locations in Saint Paul and
drafted separate constitutions.44 After each had prepared a
draft, the leaders realized the futility of continued partisan sepa-
ration.45 Consequently, a "conference committee" of represent-
atives of both groups met to draft a common proposal.4 6
Handwritten drafts were then prepared, which were returned to
the two separate "conventions."47 They separately adopted and
signed the drafts and adjourned.48
Since the convention took place in the days before photocopy-
ing, there were numerous discrepancies between the two drafts,
most of which were minor.49 The Secretary of the Territory, who
conducted the election on the proposed constitution, managed
to avoid designating which of the constitutions was being
adopted. He merely put to the people the question of whether
the constitution proposed by the convention in Saint Paul
should be adopted, without clearly designating which of the two
documents was under consideration. The people overwhelm-
ingly approved. 50 Following federal congressional action, in
41. See ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 72.
42. See ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 75-86.
43. Fifty-nine delegates were Republicans, one of which did not have official cre-
dentials. Fifty-six delegates were Democrats, six of which did not have official creden-
tials. Thus, the two groups of delegates numbered more than the authorized
membership of the convention. Id. at 75.
44. Id. at 88-92.
45. Id. at 97.
46. Id. at 98. This might be described as a kind of partisan bicameralism, in which
each party had unanimous control of one "house" of the convention.
47. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 109. The Democratic and Republican handwritten
constitutions are reproduced in volume 1 of MINN. STAT. ANN. 161 (1994).
48. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 109.
49. Id. at 110. Some examples include using a comma instead of a semicolon or
substituting the word "judge" for "justice." The two constitutions "differ[ed] from each
other in 300 minor respects." Id. See also id. at 270-75 (detailing each variance between
the two documents).
50. Id. at 133.
(Vol. 20
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1858 Minnesota became a state, albeit one with a slightly astig-
matic constitution. 51
No legal disputes arose over the differences in the two versions
of the constitution. 2 Citizens may have been unaware of any
differences, since the public printer issued a single version that
was long used by the courts." Indeed, the printer introduced
some variations of his own into what is now article 13, section 4,
of the constitution by slightly changing its words. The constitu-
tion originally required companies that exercised eminent do-
main powers to "carry the mineral, agricultural and other
productions or manufactures on equal and reasonable terms."
54
The underscored words were changed in the printing of 1883 to
read "productions of manufactures," an obviously meaningless
phrase. 5  Without any legislative authorization, the public
printer then made sense of the phrase in 1885, without re-
turning to the original text, by changing it to "productions of
manufacturers," a much narrower meaning than the original.56
It remained in that new form in legislative manuals and statute
books, until the 1974 revision.
In the 115 years from 1858 to 1973, no fewer than 186 amend-
ments to the constitution were formally proposed.57 Many of
them were adopted by the people. 8 Some amendments
changed small details while others added entire articles.59 Some
articles, especially the article relating to the judiciary, were com-
51. Id. at 137-38. "At the time of its entry Minnesota was the third largest state in
land area-only Texas and California were larger." Election Div., Sec'y of State, MINNE-
SOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1993-1994, at 34-40 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE MANUAL].
52. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 110.
53. The common text was reproduced in the Legislative Manuals and in compila-
tions of statutes.
54. The handwritten originals are reproduced at I MINN. STAT. ANN. 186 (Demo-
crat document) and 226 (Republican document). (The provision was then contained in
art. X, § 4).
55. MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, 1885, 74.
56. MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, 1887, 89.
57. For a list of these proposed amendments see LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note
51, at 34-40.
58. Id.
59. Article XVI on highways was added in 1920 and revised in 1956; article 17 on
forest fires was added in 1924; article XVIII on forestation in 1926; article XIX on aero-
nautics in 1944; article XX, creating a veterans bonus in 1948, and article XXI, dealing
with taconite taxation in 1964.
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pletely rewritten.6 ° As a result, the constitution grew longer,
more complex, repetitive, and difficult to understand.
The longest amendment was the highways amendment of
1920.61 Representing a political compromise between motorists,
who wanted to build new roads, and taxpayers, who did not want
them financed by general revenues, 62 the amendment provided
a scheme for financing highways with motor vehicle revenues.63
The framers of this proposal were also concerned about the po-
tential for favoritism in the selection of highway routes, so they
wrote the routes of 70 major state highways into the text of the
constitution. 64 Those routes remained part of the constitution
until 1957, when an amendment relegated them to a lengthy
footnote. 65 The Revisor banished them to a cross-reference in
the 1969 text.
66
A Constitutional Study Commission, headed by former Gover-
nor Elmer L. Andersen, was established in the early 1970s to
study the constitution and propose amendments. 67 The commis-
sion proposed a number of changes to the constitution, covering
a variety of issues.68 Perhaps the most important of them was the
Structure and Form Amendment, which proposed a simplifica-
tion of the constitution and a reduction and modernization of its
verbiage. 69 This amendment was prepared by Jack Davies, then a
State Senator and a member of the commission. After review by
the full commission and considerable work by the legislature,
the proposal was approved by the voters in November of 1974.70
The voters were asked:
60. The judiciary article was completely revised in 1956. See Laws, 1955, c. 881. T.
BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE, 599-80 (1963).
61. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 201. The goal of this amendment was to "get Min-
nesota out of the mud." Id. at 202 n.235.
62. The final article of the new constitution, article XIV, carries forward this treat-
ment of the public highway system. MINN. CONST. art. XIV.
63. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 40.
64. Id. at 252-63.
65. MINN. CONST. art. XVI, reprinted in 1 MINN. STAT., at 50 (1957).
66. Compare 1 MINN. STAT., at 49 (1969).
67. 1 MINN. STAT. ANN. 129 (1976).
68. The final report is published as Minnesota Constitutional Study Commission, Final
Report (1973). For a discussion of the earlier Minnesota Constitution Commission of
1947-48 and the aftermath of its recommendations, see G. Theodore Mitau, Constitu-
tional Change by Amendment: Recommendations of the Minnesota Constitutional Commission in
Ten Years'Perspective, 44 MINN. L. Rv. 461 (1959).
69. 1 MINN. STAT. ANN. 131-32 (1976).
70. 1974 MINN. LAws ch. 409.
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Shall the Minnesota Constitution be amended in all its arti-
cles to improve its clarity by removing obsolete and inconse-
quential provisions, by improving its organization and by
correcting grammar and style of language, but without mak-
ing any consequential changes in its legal effect?7
The final phrase, without making any consequential changes in its
legal effect, is significant. The phrase indicates that the current
constitution is not written on a clean slate. Because the amend-
ment did not intend to make any consequential changes, inter-
pretations of the previous constitution have a continuing
validity. When researching issues under the new language, refer-
ence should be made to the previous version and to the interpre-
tations thereunder. This can sometimes be a frustrating
endeavor, since provisions of the old constitution were fre-
quently dispersed to several parts of the new one. A concor-
dance that allows the tracing of provisions from one document
to the other was published in the 1974 version of Minnesota
Statutes.72
There have, of course, been additional amendments since
1974.7' These provisions, however, have the luxury of standing
alone. Because each of the post-1974 amendments has its own
legislative history and a unique text, constitutional interpreta-
tion should be simpler.
With this historical backdrop in mind, the following section
briefly explores the textual structure of the Minnesota
Constitution.
B. A "Short Tour" of the Minnesota Constitution
A table of contents of the articles of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion is set forth in Appendix One. For the individual litigant,
the most important provisions are to be found at the beginning
and the end, specifically in article I and articles X through XIII.
These confer substantive rights or liberties on citizens of the
state and limit the power of government. The intervening arti-
cles primarily address the structure and organization of govern-
71. Id. § 3.
72. 4 MiN. STAT. 6329 (1974).
73. For example, in 1982 an amendment was adopted creating a Minnesota Court
of Appeals. Again, in 1982, an amendment was adopted that permitted the legislature
to authorize on-track parimutuel betting on horse racing. In 1988, an amendment was
adopted that permitted the legislature to authorize a state-operated lottery. See LEGISLA-
TIVE MANUAL, supra note 51, at 40.
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ment. These intervening articles should not be overlooked
because they may be important in examining the validity of gov-
ernmental actions and are of vital significance for public
officials.
The bill of rights is contained in article I of the Minnesota
Constitution. The Minnesota version is much longer and more
detailed than its federal counterpart. The importance of indi-
vidual rights to the founders of the Minnesota Constitution is
further demonstrated by the placement of the bill of rights at
the beginning of the document-before any governmental insti-
tutions are established-rather than as a series of amendments
at the end, as it appears in the Federal Constitution.
Many of the provisions of the Minnesota Constitution parallel
the language of the federal document, but others raise signifi-
cant new areas of protection. Article I was originally drafted in
1857, TM a decade before the adoption of the federal Fourteenth
Amendment. 75 As a result, article I replicates and expands upon
many of the liberties expressed in the text of the original Federal
Constitution and the first ten amendments. Omitted, however,
is any express mention of equal protection. That doctrine was
left to subsequent judicial development.
76
Individual rights are scattered through the remainder of the
instrument, especially in articles X through XIII. These articles
77 78deal with taxation, appropriations and finance, special legis-
74. MINN. CONST. art. I (amended 1974). The 1857 constitution is reprinted in the
Minnesota Statutes Annotated and in editions of the Minnesota Statutes published
before 1976.
75. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the legislatures in 30 of 36 states as
of July 21, 1868. U.S.C.A. CONsT. art. XIV historical note, at 7.
76. See Iijima, supra note 13, at 337.
77. MINN. CONST. art. X. A Minnesota court, discussing this provision, has stated
that the "uniformity clause of our state constitution is no more restrictive upon the
legislature's power to tax or classify than is the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." See Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 736 n.2 (Minn. 1979),
appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 804 (1979).
78. MINN. CONST. art. XI. This article was interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Minnesota Hous, Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 297 Minn. 155, 210 N.W.2d 298
(1973). In this case, the court held that assistance of the state housing finance agency
in the financing of housing for persons of low and moderate incomes through the
making of federally insured loans was for a "public purpose" and, therefore, was permis-
sible under the constitutional provision that permitted levy and collection of taxes only
for public purposes. Id. at 166-74, 210 N.W.2d at 305-08.
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lation and local government, and miscellaneous other subjects.79
While many of these provisions address the organization and dis-
tribution of governmental powers and responsibilities, others ex-
press significant individual protections. For example, taxes must
be levied uniformly and for a public purpose. 0 Special assess-
ments cannot exceed the value added by the improvement.81
Two separate limitations on special legislation are contained in
article XII. One of them requires the use of general laws, when
possible.82 The other absolutely prohibits special legislation in a
long list of circumstances.8 " These provisions, requiring uni-
formity in specific situations or prohibiting disparate treatment
in others, became part of the intellectual history that led to the
development of an implied doctrine of equal protection based
on the state constitution. 4
Article XIII contains a long list of miscellaneous subjects.
Most significant may be the requirement of "uniform" and "effi-
cient" public education. 5 But one should not forget the signifi-
cant protection for gardeners by the "vegetable clause," 6 which
may be unique to Minnesota! It provides: "Any person may sell
or peddle the products of the farm or garden occupied and cul-
tivated by him without obtaining a license therefor.""'
The intervening provisions deal mostly with the structure of
state government. After delimiting the boundaries of the state
79. MINN. CONST. art. XIII. Some of these "miscellaneous" other subjects include:
uniform system of public schools, prohibition against aiding sectarian schools, lands
taken for public use, veterans' bonuses, and militia organization. Id.
80. MINN. CONST. art XII. For example, a court held that special legislation that
required all persons who are not members of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe to pay a
special licensing fee for the privilege of fishing within Leech Lake Reservation is not an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection to non-Indians. See State v. Forge, 262
NW.2d 341, 347-48 (Minn. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 919 (1978).
81. A Minnesota Attorney General's opinion discusses this matter, noting that
"[s] pecial assessments must be based on special benefits to particular property involved,
measured by the enhancement of property value resulting from the improvement."
Op. Att'y Gen. 408-C (1955).
82. MINN. STAT. art. XII, § 1.
83. Id.
84. See lijima, supra note 13, at 337; see also Schumann v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion, 312 Minn. 477, 253 N.W.2d 130 (1977) (analyzing equal protection under the
Minnesota Constitution). The Schumann court noted that the equal protection provi-
sion of the state constitution imposes no greater restrictions on legislative power to
establish classifications than the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 480-81, 253 N.W.2d at 132.
85. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
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in article II, the constitution continues in article III to require
strict separation of powers unless otherwise expressly permit-
ted."8 This differs from the federal document which is predi-
cated on a presumption of separation of powers but never
expressly articulates a rule to that effect.8 9 Articles IV, V, and VI
deal with the legislative, 90 executive, 91 and judicial92 branches re-
spectively. Articles VII, VIII, and IX address voting rights, 93 im-
peachment of officers,9 4 and constitutional amendments95 and
Article XVI provides for the collection and distribution of motor
vehicle and fuel taxes.96
The Minnesota Constitution can be a fertile source of in-
dependent state analysis for resourceful attorneys andjudges. In
order for independent state analysis to flourish, however, legal
professionals must become familiar not only with the Minnesota
Constitution itself, but also must learn to craft their analyses and
arguments on truly independent state grounds. This will aid in
the development of a body of jurisprudence interpreting the
fundamental law of the State of Minnesota. The following sec-
tion highlights some of the most important considerations, and
looks at how differences in language between the state and fed-
eral constitutions, in the context of individual rights, can furnish
reasons to depart from federal precedent to consider questions
on state grounds alone.
IV. INVOKING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Procedural Considerations
Complying with procedural requirements is important. Law-
yers seeking relief or defense under the Minnesota Constitution
must allege state constitutional grounds separately in pleadings
88. Id. art. III, § 1.
89. See Springer v. Phillippine, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (noting that, while some
state constitutions expressly provide for separation of powers and others, like the Fed-
eral Constitution do not, the principle is "implicit in all").
90. MINN. CONST. art. IV.
91. Id. art. V.
92. Id. arL VI.
93. Id. art. VII.
94. Id. art. VIII.
95. MINN. CONST. art- IX.
96. MINN. CONST. art XVI, § 3. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text for the
history of this article.
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and argument.97 Judges should separately identify all state con-
stitutional grounds when rendering decisions.98 If the state issue
presents an "adequate and independent state ground" that sup-
ports a state court decision, the effect will be to cut off all ave-
nues of appeal to the United States Supreme Court.99
An example is perhaps better than an explanation. Assume
that a defendant in a criminal case argues that his or her rights
were violated by an unconstitutional search and seizure. If that
defendant bases the claim solely on federal constitutional rights
and prevails in the state system, the state may seek certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court and possibly obtain reversal of
the decision. If, however, the defendant bases the claim on both
federal and state constitutional violations and prevails in the
state supreme court on state grounds, the case is not subject to
further review in the United States Supreme Court. In the latter
instance, the evidence must be suppressed without regard to
whether there would be a different outcome under federal con-
stitutional analysis.
A state supreme court can be more protective of individual
rights than the United States Supreme Court without raising the
possibility of further review. 00 It may not, however, be less pro-
tective of individual rights. 10 1 To deviate from the federal stan-
dard, however, the state court must explicitly rely on a state
ground and treat that as an independent basis.10 2 This ap-
proach, however, has not always been followed."0
Many older state decisions treated federal and state constitu-
tional doctrines interchangeably, using precedents from federal
97. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 4, at 683. Sheridan and Delapena offer
practical advice to attorneys bringing state constitutional claims and include sample
briefs for two particular state constitutional claims that might be raised and argued in
Minnesota. Id. at 723-42. See alsoJohn Henry Hingson III, State Constitutions & the Cim-
inalDefense Lauyer A Necessary Virtue, THE CHAMPION December 1990, at 6-7 (describing
"how to 'do' state constitutional law").
98. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 4, at 691-708.
99. Id. at 694-95, 700.
100. Id. at 690, 715-16.
101. Id. at 688,
102. Id. at 698-701.
103. See Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 215
(1992). Judge Linde, Senior Judge of the Oregon Supreme Court, discusses some of
the problems created when federal questions are considered before state constitutional
claims. Id. at 216-19. He goes on to consider whether states are "overusing" their state
constitutions to the point of treating constitutional law as common law. Id. at 225-28.
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cases to interpret state language. 10 4  Modern state supreme
courts that follow this path do so at their peril. As federal pro-
tections are being constricted by the United States Supreme
Court, state courts willing to rely on federal precedent run the
risk that the Court will likewise constrict the state protections.0 5
To avoid this consequence, explicit reliance on state grounds in
the state decision is essential. 06
B. Textual Differences as Grounds for Independent Analysis of
Individual Rights
As indicated in Section III.B, individual claimants will find the
most immediately applicable rights enumerated in the state bill
of rights, article I of the Minnesota Constitution. Other rights,
however, are scattered throughout the document, particularly in
articles X through XIII. Appendix Two sets forth federal and
state rights in parallel form. Appendix Three provides addi-
tional references to some of the rights expressly secured solely
by the state constitution.
Differences in language between rights protected in the fed-
eral and state constitutions might be, or may become, very im-
portant. At one time, the Minnesota Supreme Court tended to
gloss over any difference in the language of passages in the Min-
nesota Constitution and similar federal provisions in an attempt
104. See, e.g., National Tea Co. v. State, 205 Minn. 443, 447, 286 N.W. 360, 362
(1939) (construing both U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 and MINN. CONST. art. IX, § I as
imposing "identical restrictions upon the legislative power of the state in respect to
classification for purposes of taxation" and citing Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277
U.S. 32, 37 (1928) as illustrative of the principle that "all similarly situated shall be
treated alike"); State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 577, 287 N.W. 313, 316 (1939) (citing
Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) in construing art. I, § 2 and art. IV, § 33 of
the Minnesota Constitution); State ex rel. Burnquist v. District Court, 141 Minn. 1, 17,
168 N.W. 634, 637 (1918) (citing Mississippi v.Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866) in constru-
ing the provision of the Minnesota Constitution that imposes a duty on the Governor to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed").
105. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (holding that state court
decisions that are interwoven with or "appear" to rest primarily on federal law are re-
viewed as though based on federal grounds).
106. See Hingson, supra note 95, at 10 (setting out "plain statement boilerplate").
This symposium issue contains various examples of independent analysis under the
Minnesota Constitution that illustrate this point. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Bartell, Giving
Sobriety Checkpoints the Cold Shoulder in Minnesota: A Proposed Balancing Test for Suspicionless
Seizures Under the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 515 (1994); Ijima
supra note 13, at 337; Olson, supra note 31, at 439; Steenson, supra note 31, at 383;
Kathleen Smith Ruhland, Equal Opportunity Education for Minnesota's School Children: A
Missed Opportunity by the Court, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 559 (1994).
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to create a uniform interpretation for the federal and state con-
stitutions. 10 7 Thus, it was once said that the uniformity provi-
sions of the taxation article meant the same thing as the federal
equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment."0
This approach is no longer followed. As Justice Wahl has re-
cently stated:
To harness interpretation of our state constitutional guar-
antees of equal protection to federal standards and shift the
meaning of Minnesota's constitution every time federal case
law changes would undermine the integrity and indepen-
dence of our state constitution and degrade the special role
of this court, as the highest court of a sovereign state, to re-
spond to the needs of Minnesota citizens.
109
The following section illustrates how minor differences in lan-
guage might be extremely significant.
Note the single word of difference in the following texts:
Federal: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted. 110
State: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments
inflicted.111
The United States Supreme Court has held that capital punish-
ment is not a violation of the federal standard quoted above. 12
If the Minnesota legislature were to seek to reintroduce capital
punishment here, the single word of difference could render
federal precedent irrelevant. Indeed, use of the word "or"
rather than "and" could lend weight to an argument that the
absence of capital punishment in this state for nearly a century
made the death penalty "unusual" here without regard to other
analysis.
Examples of this kind of difference abound. Another is found
in the more expansive language of the Minnesota Constitution's
107. See, e.g., State v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 451 n.18, 156 N.W.2d 908,
912 (1968) (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court considers the federal and Min-
nesota constitutional guarantees of due process and free exercise of religion to be the
same).
108. See, e.g., Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981).
109. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889 (citing In Re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 773
(Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J., concurring specially)).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
111. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
112. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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"taking" clause,"' which speaks of property being "taken, de-
stroyed or damaged," rather than the narrower language of the
Fifth Amendment, which speaks only of property "taken."" 4
Could this difference be a basis for an expanded application of
the taking doctrine in Minnesota?'
1 5
Another example of state court action is found in the protec-
tion provided by the Minnesota Constitution for freedom of reli-
gion. ' 16 Federal protection of the free exercise of religion is
found only in part of a single sentence in the First Amend-
ment.' 17 In contrast, the Minnesota protection extends, in great
detail, over two lengthy sections, 8 with an additional, separate
section that also addresses the establishment of religion."'
This brief introduction to the Minnesota Constitution is not
intended as an exhaustive analysis of the textual differences in
detail. Nevertheless, the few situations addressed here serve as a
reminder that careful attention must be given to differences in
wording between the state and federal texts. When wording is
different, even if only slightly, the potential for different inter-
pretation in the state court is always present.
Express protections and textual variations are not the exclu-
sive sources of broader state protection. In searching for individ-
ual rights, one must look beyond the state bill of rights. Some
rights are spelled out elsewhere in the state constitution. Other
rights are part of a broader "unwritten constitution," which the
Minnesota courts have recognized for more than half a cen-
113. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
114. U.S. CoNST. amend V. "No person shall.., be deprived of... property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." Id.; see also Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 41-42
(Minn. 1991) (holding that damage to private property by city police constitutes a tak-
ing within the meaning of the Minnesota Constitution); compare Harris v. United States,
205 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir. 1953) (holding that a single act of the government that
damages or destroys private property is not a taking in a constitutional sense but,
rather, is a tortious act for which the government is only consensually liable).
115. See Olson, supra note 31, at 433.
116. See, e.g., Hershberger 1, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); see also supra notes 15-24
and accompanying text.
117. U.S. CONST. amend I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; .... " Id.
118. MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 16-17.
119. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
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tury1 20 To appreciate all of the rights available, one should read
all of the constitution.
"Buried" provisions in the Minnesota Constitution that prom-
ise direct and immediate application for individuals include:
-The "uniformity" clause regarding public education,
which is found in article XIII, section 1.121 This was recently
the subject of substantial litigation in the state Supreme
Court. 122
-The "uniformity" clause regarding taxation, which is
found in article X, section 1.123 Although written to allow the
legislature broad discretion in classification for tax purposes,
this provision provides some limit on the drafting of tax
legislation.
-Two "general laws" clauses, which may restrict the au-
thority of the legislature to enact special legislation in certain
cases. The first two sentences of article XII, section 1, provide
a general rule under which a special law may be enacted only
if a general law could not be made applicable.124 The third
sentence, however, provides a long list of circumstances in
which a special law cannot be passed at all.
125
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also recognized other con-
stitutional principles for which there is no direct text in the doc-
ument. Most notable of these is a constitutional principle of
equality.1 26 While the state constitution has always contained
rules requiring uniformity of taxation and of education, it con-
tains no general equal protection clause.1 2 7 Nevertheless, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, in the 1920s and 1930s adopted a
120. The Minnesota Constitution provides that "[t]he enumeration of rights in this
constitution shall not deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people."
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16. Among these unenumerated rights are: equal protection,
stated in State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991); the right to privacy, defined in
In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); and property and family
rights, found in Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W.2d 400
(1944).
121. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
122. For a detailed analysis of the education clause of the Minnesota Constitution,
see Ruhland, supra note 104, at 559.
123. MINN. CONsT. art. X, § 1.
124. MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., lijima, supra note 13, at 337; Ruhland, supra note 104, at 559.
127. The original constitution of 1857 was written before adoption of the federal
Equal Protection Clause, which was ratified as the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. See
U.S.C.A. amend. XIV, § 1 historical notes (1987). The Minnesota Constitution revision
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broad-ranging principle of equal protection, which it has not
been reluctant to apply. Equal protection under the Minnesota
Constitution is based upon principles in the text, but clearly
reaches beyond the exact language of its command. 128 A right to
privacy may similarly be drawn from state constitutional
provisions.
129
Whether the source be express state constitutional provisions,
differences in the language of state provisions compared with
their federal counterparts, or buried provisions subject to civil
libertarian inferences, the Minnesota Constitution is a rich
source of independent state analysis for the resourceful
practitioner.
V. CONCLUSION
State constitutional law has become increasingly important in
a way perhaps unparalleled since the beginning of this century.
This may be in response to dissatisfaction with vacillating federal
standards, or with recent limitations by the United States
Supreme Court on individual rights. As a consequence, states
like Minnesota with progressive traditions of protecting individ-
ual rights are turning to their state constitutions to analyze con-
stitutional issues.
Minnesota's three constitutions vary in significant respects
from the United States Constitution and have their own unique
history. In order to take advantage of this source of constitu-
tional analysis, practitioners and courts must carefully distin-
guish between federal and state grounds. Whenever
constitutional issues are presented (and even in some cases in
which they do not arise) practitioners must remember to sepa-
rately examine the state limitations, separately plead them, and
separately argue them. In this way, Minnesota will more effec-
tively meet the challenge of safeguarding the individual liberties
of its citizens within the shrinking universe of federal
protections.
128. See lijima, supra note 13.
129. See Steenson, supra note 31.
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Art. I, § 3
Art. I, § 16
Art. I, § 17



































Art. I, § 11
Art. I, § 4
Art. I, § 11
Art. I, § 13
Art. I, § 2
Art. 1, § 7
Art. I, § 8
no general clause
Art. X, § 1
Art. XII, § 1
Art. XIII, § 1
*As incorporated by Amendment XIV.
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APPENDIX THREE




Taxation for public purpose only
Special assessment limitations
Limitations (2) on special laws
Uniform system of schools
Rights of vegetable peddlers
Art. I, § 8
Art. I, § 15
Art. X, § 1
Art. X, § 1
Art. X, § 1
Art. XI, § 1
Art. XIII, § 1
Art. XIII, § 7
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